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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 00-2563

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ARACELIS MERCEDES,
Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 99-cr-00314-2)
District Court Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 4, 2003
Before: SLOVITER, RENDELL and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: February 19, 2003)

OPINION OF THE COURT

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, Aracelis Mercedes, appeals the District Court’s denial of her motion to
suppress evidence of the cocaine seized from her person as well as statements she made to
the officer who arrested her. We will affirm.
The following facts were developed at the District Court hearing on the motion to

suppress. The District Court, in an opinion issued from the bench, laid out its findings of
fact in exhaustive detail. We, however, refer only to those facts we find pertinent to our
discussion.
Mercedes, and a cohort, Pelagio Baret, were arrested en route to Rochester, New
York from San Juan, Puerto Rico during a layover at Philadelphia International Airport.
Officers of the Drug Enforcement Administration (D.E.A.) in the San Juan and Philadelphia
airports learned of circumstances surrounding Mercedes and Baret’s travel that they
considered suspicious. At the Philadelphia airport, the D.E.A. officers confronted
Mercedes and Baret. Initially, the officers merely spoke to Mercedes. Shortly thereafter,
Mercedes consented to the search of her carry-on bag and, then, her purse. While the
officers searched Mercedes’s suitcase, Mercedes engaged in a series of bizarre activities
that we do not find necessary to detail other than to note that these activities involved
Mercedes seemingly revoking and re-granting consent to search and also wandering toward
the bathroom. During one of the various exchanges she had with the officers, Mercedes
reached into her purse – which she had been clutching intently and shielding from the
officers even after she granted consent to search it – and kept her hand in the purse for
several seconds. One of the officers asked Mercedes to remove her hand from the bag.
Mercedes verbally agreed, but did not remove her hand, and continued toward the restroom.
An officer then placed his hand on Mercedes’s arm and removed the half-opened purse
from Mercedes’s possession. Thereafter, an officer checked the bag and discovered a
package wrapped with gray duct tape that she believed, and later confirmed, to contain
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cocaine – a kilogram’s worth – but no weapons.
The officers immediately placed Mercedes under arrest. One of the officers, who
had been translating for the Spanish-speaking Mercedes, read Mercedes her Miranda rights
in Spanish. Mercedes asked if the Government would pay for an attorney, prompting the
officer to read her her Miranda rights for a second time. Mercedes was then taken to the
Philadelphia Police Department’s station in the airport, where the Spanish-speaking officer
processed her. While the officer asked her for biographical information, Mercedes told
the officer that she would only speak to him with an attorney present. Soon thereafter,
however, Mercedes, without prompting, began asking the officer questions regarding her
arrest – namely the facts, circumstances and possible penalties of her case. In response,
the officer reminded her that he could not speak to her without an attorney present and that
he only wanted to get biographical information. Then, for a third time, the officer read
Mercedes her Miranda rights, and asked her if she wanted to speak to him without an
attorney. Mercedes indicated in Spanish that she did wish to do so. Thereafter, Mercedes
made various incriminating statements.
An ensuing indictment charged Mercedes with one count of conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and one count of
knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting the
possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Mercedes filed a motion to suppress the cocaine and the statements
she made to the arresting officer. As we have noted, the District Court held a hearing,
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heard extensive testimony regarding what had transpired, and issued an opinion from the
bench denying the motion. Mercedes then entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving
the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress as permitted under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2). Hence, this appeal. We exercise jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
Before us, Mercedes argues that the District Court made three errors of law
specific to her motion to suppress. We review the denial of the motion to suppress for
clear error as to the underlying factual findings and exercise plenary review over questions
of law. U.S. v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2002). Importantly, Mercedes does not
challenge the District Court’s findings of facts, and an independent review of the record
reveals that those findings are well-supported by the record and certainly not clearly
erroneous.
Mercedes first argues that, under Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), the initial
questioning undertaken by the officers constituted a seizure such that all evidence obtained
subsequent to that questioning must be suppressed. In Royer, officers stopped a person
who fit a “drug courier profile” for questioning in an airport. Id. at 493. The court
determined that “when the officers identified themselves as narcotics agents, told Royer
that he was suspected of transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany them to the
police room, while retaining his ticket and driver’s license and without indicating in any
way that he was free to depart, Royer was effectively seized for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 501.
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As the Royer court expressly recognized, however, “law enforcement officers do
not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in
another public place, by asking h[er] if [s]he is willing to answer some questions, [or] by
putting questions to h[er] if the person is willing to listen.” Id. at 497. Moreover, “[a]sking
for and examining [a plane] ticket and [a] driver’s license [are] no doubt permissible.” Id. at
501. The officers here did no more than that and, thus, there was no Fourth Amendment
violation.
Next, Mercedes argues that the officers’ search of her purse violated the Fourth
Amendment and, therefore, the cocaine seized as a result of the search should have been
suppressed. The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness. Michigan
Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990). For the most part, searches and
seizures undertaken without a warrant and probable cause are unreasonable and violate the
Fourth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. Officers are permitted, however, to
conduct an investigatory stop of a person if they reasonably suspect that criminal activity is
afoot, Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1996) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 30 (1968)), and they may conduct a limited search of a person and her surroundings if
they have a reasonable suspicion that the she poses a threat to them or those around them.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. A search based on reasonable suspicion must be restricted to areas
under a suspect’s immediate control that could contain a weapon. Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1051 (1983). What constitutes “reasonable suspicion” is not capable of precise
articulation, but, rather, the determination is based on “commonsense, nontechnical
5

conceptions that deal with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695 (citations
and internal quotations omitted). In evaluating whether reasonable suspicion existed, the
officers’ experience should be taken into account. See id. at 700; Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
The basic issue is whether, given the “totality of the circumstances,” United States v.
Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 353 (3d Cir. 2000), “a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief” that criminal activity was afoot or that “his
safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
While Mercedes focuses the bulk of her argument before us on whether she
consented to the search of her bag, the District Court did not rely on consent in finding that
the search was valid. Rather, the District Court concluded that the officers had reasonable
suspicion to believe that Mercedes was engaging in criminal activity and that she
jeopardized their and others’ safety when she placed her hand into her purse. Accordingly,
the Court concluded that neither the stop of Mercedes that occurred when the officer
grabbed her arm nor the subsequent search of her purse violated the Fourth Amendment.
The Court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed was based on the officers’
observations and experience. The Court credited the officers’ testimony and their belief
that: Mercedes was attempting to flee; the situation was getting out of control; Mercedes’s
large purse could carry weapons; and it was too dangerous for one officer to follow
Mercedes into the restroom. The Court also noted the suspicious circumstances
surrounding Mercedes’s flight plans and her initial insistence that she was traveling alone.
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All of these factors, combined with the fact that she clutched her purse tightly and reached
into it, led the Court to conclude that the officers acted with reasonable suspicion, making
it irrelevant whether Mercedes consented to the search. The record supports the Court’s
conclusions that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and briefly search
Mercedes’s purse. Therefore, the officers’ actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, Mercedes argues the officers violated her Fifth Amendment rights by
eliciting self-incriminating statements from her in violation of Miranda. In Miranda, the
Supreme Court held that “certain warnings must be given before a suspect's statement made
during custodial interrogation could be admitted in evidence.” United States v. Dickerson,
530 U.S. 428, 431-32 (2001) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436). As is common
knowledge, the Miranda warnings include the right to remain silent and the right to an
attorney. Nonetheless, not all statements that police obtain after taking a person into
custody fall within the safeguards of Miranda. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300
(1980) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478)). For instance, questioning regarding only
biographical data certainly do not. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601-02(1990)
(plurality opinion); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 572 n.2 (3d Cir. 1995)
(recognizing a “routine booking exception” to Miranda). Still, officers are required to
respect scrupulously a suspect’s request for a lawyer and not initiate further interrogation.
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1042-44 (1983) (plurality opinion). Whether
interrogation that follows a suspect’s invocation of her Miranda rights violated the Fifth
Amendment depends upon “‘whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to
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silence had occurred, that is, whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and
found to be so under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the
accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities.’” Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at
1046 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 n.9 (1981)).
The District Court, in finding no violation of the Fifth Amendment or Miranda,
noted that, while Mercedes seemed to invoke her right to counsel, she initiated further
conversation and that, under the circumstances, she voluntarily and knowingly waived her
rights to counsel and to remain silent. The Court determined that the waiver came after
Acosta read Mercedes her Miranda rights for the third time, Mercedes indicated she
understood them, and Mercedes agreed to speak to Acosta without a lawyer present. The
District Court’s finding that her waiver was made knowingly and intelligently is wellsupported by the record. Once Mercedes initiated the conversation regarding her case and
voluntarily and knowingly waived her right to counsel, the officers were free to discuss the
case with her. Therefore, the incriminating statements Mercedes subsequently made were
properly deemed admissible by the District Court.
As a result, we will affirm the District Court’s Order.

_________________________
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TO THE CLERK OF COURT:
Please file the foregoing opinion.

Circuit Judge
Dated:
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